One of the most difficult and perplexing tenets of classical theism is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Broadly put, this is generally understood to be the thesis that God is altogether without any proper parts, composition, or metaphysical complexity whatsoever. For a good deal more than a millennium, veritable armies ofphilosophical theologians -Jewish, Christian and Islamicproclaimed the truth and importance of divine simplicity. Yet in our own time, the doctrine has enjoyed no such support. Among many otherwise orthodox theists, those who do not just disregard it completely explicitly deny it. However, in a couple of recent articles, William E. Mann has attempted to expound the idea of divine simplicity anew and to defend it against a number of criticisms.1 He even has gone so far as to hint at reaffirming its importance, suggesting that the doctrine may have a significant amount of explanatory power and other theoretical virtue as part of an overall account of the nature of God, by either entailing or in other ways providing for much else that traditional theists have wanted to say about God. In this paper, I want to take a close look at Mann's formulation of the doctrine and at a general supporting theory he adumbrates in his attempt to render more plausible, or at least more defensible, various of its elements and implications. As Mann has made what is arguably the best attempt to defend the doctrine in recent years, I think that such an examination is important and will repay our efforts.
the property view of simplicity can be avoided completely. The distinction he draws is one between properties and property instances. Roughly, a property is an abstract object capable of exemplification. A property instance is a particular exemplification of a property. A great number of property instances, moreover, are concrete particulars. What Mann most likely has in mind here is something like a distinction between the rectangularity of this page, as a feature of the page existing in space and time, and the property of rectangularity, which exists only as an abstract object. The application of this distinction to the doctrine of divine simplicity is, then, straightforward. God can be held to be identical with his instantiation of wisdom, his instantiation of power, and, generally, his instantiation of any property which holds true of him. From this formulation of the doctrine, it will not follow that wisdom is one and the same property as power, and so on, but only that the instance of wisdom we have in the case of God is one and the same concrete particular as the instance of power we find in deity.
And although this latter claim may sound a bit mysterious at first, it -unlike the identification of patently different properties -is in no way clearly absurd. Furthermore, this formulation of the doctrine obviously does not make God out to be an abstract object. It characterizes him rather as an individual property instance, a special sort of concrete particular. Let us refer to Mann's formulation as the property instance view of divine simplicity. Like the property view, it is meant to be a comprehensive thesis holding true in the case of every one of God's properties. Unlike the property view, Mann thinks, it is a reasonable position for a theist to hold. Before we examine whether the property instance view can succeed on both counts, we should first note an important difference between it and the property view as yet unmentioned.
Alvin Plantinga has suggested that a major reason theists historically adopted a doctrine of divine simplicity was to accommodate what he calls a 'sovereignty -aseity intuition', a fundamental conviction that God must be such as to depend on nothing distinct from himself for what he is, and such that he has everything distinct from himself within his absolute control.' The connection between this intuition and simplicity was forged by the following sort of argument: What God's nature is, and what his character is, consists in his having certain properties rather than others. Now if these properties constitutive of his nature and character were abstract objects distinct from God, he would be dependent on something distinct from himself for what he is. Furthermore, there would then be certain connections between him and these distinct objects which would not be wholly within his control. If there can be absolutely no sense in which God depends on anything distinct from him, and no sense in which anything can be outside THOMAS V. MORRIS his control, then the properties God has cannot have an ontological status distinct from him. Any such ontological distinctness is eliminated by simply identifying God with any property he has. Thus the sovereignty-aseity intuition can motivate a doctrine of divine simplicity. But notice that the view of simplicity required to accommodate such absolute sovereignty and aseity is the property view. The property instance view will not do the job. For it allows that there is at least one property existing distinct from God as an abstract object on which God is, in some sense, dependent for what he is -an instance of that property. So whatever we think about the sovereignty-aseity intuition at work in this argument, we must acknowledge that it will not act as a motivation for adopting a property instance view of simplicity. If this version of the doctrine of divine simplicity is to be a reasonable position for a theist to hold, other reasons must be found for subscribing to it.
Although Mann does not acknowledge this difference between the property view and his own favoured property instance view -indeed, he articulates his view after delineating briefly the aseity motivation for a doctrine of simplicity, and without noting the lack of motivational connection with his own formulation -he does in fact suggest some other reason that theists might have for adopting a property instance doctrine of simplicity. In brief, he seems to see the view of simplicity he expounds as the most general account available of the metaphysical nature of deity which will be free of any obviously false implications while at the same time entailing, and allowing for a defence of, some of the other striking and important claims about God of something, and of something apparently more ontologically fundamental than themselves. For the identity of this page could survive the excision of its rectangularity if, for example, its corners were cut off, but the rectangularity of this page conversely could not survive the destruction of the page itself. Is every property instance merely a feature of something more fundamental than itself? If so, and God is a property instance, the clearly unacceptable consequence will follow that God is a feature of something ontologically more fundamental than himself. This would not be much of an improvement on the view that God is an abstract object. However, Mann introduces a notion which, if acceptable, could be used to block the claim that this characteristic holds true of every sort of property instance. The notion he introduces is that of a rich property. A rich property is defined by Mann as a conjunctive property having as its conjuncts all and only properties which hold true of a particular individual. These will include, he says, both essential and accidental properties. So in the case of any object, however ontologically fundamental, there will exist a corresponding rich property. It is Mann's suggestion that all objects can be viewed as property instances of their appropriate rich property. On this conception, every individual is numerically identical with a property instance. This will hold true of tables, chairs, pages, Mann himself, and of course, God. Certain property instances thus are not features of anything more fundamental than themselves. These are instances of rich properties. Mann's argument is that on the property instance view of divine simplicity, God is held to be numerically identical with just this sort of property instance, an instance of a rich property. For if God is identical with an instance of each of his properties, it follows that in his case there exists only one property instance, however many properties he has being exemplified. And whenever all of a being's properties are exemplified in one property instance, it will follow that that instance can be nothing become clear in the next section. Right now, we need to attend to another implication of his version of divine simplicity. In trying to recommend his property instance view of simplicity, Mann has to render plausible the consequence that the instance of each property God has is identical with the instance of every other divine attribute, as well as defending the central claim that God is a property instance. To this end, he sketches out some elements of a theory of property and property instance identity, to which we now turn. is an instance of a property which is essential to him. This is why on Mann's view we have in the case of God a collapse of the distinction between a rich property, liberally construed, and an haecceity. Now this panoply of distinctions and principles Mann introduces to construct and defend a view of divine simplicity has a number of consequences which require examination. First, for all their differences, the property instance view of simplicity Mann presents and the property view have in common, as has just been pointed out, an entailment we might not initially have anticipated: In the case of God, only one property is involved. On the property view it is one with which God is identical. On Mann's view, it is one whose instance God is.
This consequence is problematic in more than one way. First, there arises from it a problem of modal uniformity, a sort of problem one version of which has already been considered in connection with Mann's original definition of a rich property. Here it arises quite simply. God's properties obviously cannot differ among themselves in modal status if he has in reality only one property. But theists traditionally hold that God is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and good, yet only contingently or accidentally such that he created this world, called Abram out of Ur, spoke through Moses, and so forth. It follows from Mann's account of divine simplicity, as well as from the property view, that no such modal discriminations can be made with respect to God. And surely this is unacceptable.
Secondly, there may be in addition what we might call a supervenience problem for this conclusion about the divine attributes. The problem is this: Standard conceptions of some divine attributes seem to be conceptions of essentially supervenient properties -properties which can be exemplified only in virtue of other distinct properties being exemplified. Now, the notion of supervenience is quite common in contemporary philosophy and, difficult though it might be to understand completely, is basically a simple notion to grasp. If a property F supervenes a property G, then an instance of F essenti ally depends on there being some instance of G in association with which it exists, in the sense that no instance of F could exist unless some underlying instance of G existed simultaneously.' With this sort of relation in mind, a number of recent philosophers have claimed, for example, that human personality essentially supervenes upon corporeality of a sufficiently intricate sort of structure.
Many theists hold a conception of omniscience according to which God is omniscient in virtue of, at least in part, knowing all true propositions. If the 'in virtue of' locution is taken seriously here, then it would seem that God's omniscience is being held to supervene on his knowing this, his knowing that, and so on. Likewise, many would hold that God is omnipotent I An instance of F need not depend for its identity on the continuing existence of a particular instance of G; rather, it requires only some instance or other of G. With these acknowledged distinctions in mind, it might be thought that Mann could claim that God's knowledge is God's power since God's knowledge is nothing other than his omniscience, his power is none other than his omnipotence, and principle C does countenance his omniscience being identical with his omnipotence. Thus by the symmetry and transitivity of identity it would follow that his knowledge is his power. But principle C as it stands will not license two of the premises of this argument -the claim that God's knowledge is his omniscience, and that his power is his omnipotence. property. But, it could be maintained, it is a sort of determinate of a determinable property-knowledge, or being knowledgeable-which is degreed. Accordingly, CI could give way to some C2, a principle which, employing this distinction, would allow the identification of God's knowledge about Mann with his omniscience. Here, things begin to get a bit complicated, for then the principle will look something like this: (i) the property being F is necessarily coextensive with the property being G; or (2) at least one of these properties is a degreed property with an intrinsic maximum, and that maximal degree is necessarily coextensive with either (a) the other property, or (b) the intrinsic maximum of the other property; or (3) at least one of the properties is a determinate of a determinable, ourselves forced to swallow a modal uniformity to the exemplifications of all properties whatsoever. For consider any exemplification of an apparently accidental or contingent property. God will have the property of knowing this property to be exemplified. And this piece of knowledge will be identical to his omniscience. Thus, it will be essential to him. But if this is so, and God is a necessarily existing being, it will be a necessary truth that the original, apparently contingent property is exemplified, and that it is exemplified by the particular object which otherwise appeared accidentally to have it. It then follows of course that the actual world is the only possible world, that all our properties are essential, and so on. This is the extreme of modal uniformity.
which itself either (a) is necessarily coextensive with either (i) the other property, or (ii) an intrinsic maximum of the other property, or (iii) a determinable of which the other property is a determinate, or (iv) an intrinsic maximum of a determin able of which the other property is a determinate, or (b) has an intrinsic maximum which is necessarily coextensive with either (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) above
In 'Simplicity and Immutability in God', Mann attempts to avoid a couple of broadly related problems by distinguishing between the content of God's omniscience and the activity by which he knows, and in a similar vein between the results of what he actually wills and the power or activity of his willing.' His claim is that anyone who holds a simplicity doctrine is free to maintain that the content of God's knowledge or the results of his willing could have been different from what they are without thereby being committed to the claim that the activity by which God knows and the power by which he wills could have been different. And if this is true, it will follow that the extreme modal uniformity problem can be avoided by the defender of simplicity. which his activity of omniscience is supposed to be identical, is hard to understand. Indeed, given the most plausible position on the modal status of such metaphysical identities, the sort of divergence Mann envisions to be possible would in fact be logically impossible. I have suggested that even if some version of a Mann-style principle of property instance identity could be formulated to allow God to have trivial properties as well as his distinctively divine attributes, and which would render their instances identical to his seemingly many instances of other properties, unacceptable consequences would follow. I now want to make the stronger claim that no such formulation will succeed in even its initial task. To see why, we must examine a problem, as yet unacknowledged, with Ci and C2. Consider Mann's own power and his own knowledge. Surely, these are distinct property instances, for they can wax and wane somewhat indepen dently of one another. But assuming that omnipotence and omniscience are It seems to me that the only plausible way to avoid the unacceptable problems I have delineated while still holding to a doctrine of divine sim plicity would be to restrict the doctrine to apply only to some divine properties, abandoning the comprehensive formulation it usually receives. In light of the problem of modal uniformity, if God is held to have any essential properties at all, he cannot be held to be identical with any property instance which we have strong intuitive grounds to think exists only contingently. That is, no instance of a property which we independently judge to be contingently exemplified by God can be declared identical to him. No utterly compre hensive doctrine of divine simplicity, meant to apply to all God's properties, will avoid having modally unacceptable consequences. Likewise, in light of the problem of divine uniqueness, we cannot with any plausibility declare And it is arguable that not only will this class of relational properties need to be excluded from the doctrine of divine simplicity. For consider the property of intending to create some contingently existent physical reality or other. Most traditional theists would judge this to be a contingent property of God's. Yet it is not relational in the stipulated sense of entailing the existence of some particular contingent reality distinct from God. With such an example in mind, it looks as if someone like Mann should just specify that simplicity hold only with respect to properties we have some good grounds for judging not to be exemplified contingently by God, whether they be relational or non-relational. But of course the doctrine of simplicity cannot comprise all non-contingent properties of deity, as we have seen from the problem of divine uniqueness. The most plausible restriction which can be introduced to block this problem is to limit the doctrine to only those non-contingent properties of deity unique to God, such as, presumably, a-seity, omnipotence, omniscience, and the like. To put it somewhat picturesquely, we would then, with these restrictions, be conceiving of a simple core of deity underlying both God's shareable properties and whatever complex of contingent relations and states might be generated by divine intention and action.
First
On this restricted view, God would be identical with his mere having of omniscience and with his power of omnipotence, but not with his knowledge I Problems with this distinction were alleged by La Croix, op. cit., but can easily be circumvented.
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of Mann or his calling of Moses. Likewise, his omniscience would be identical with his omnipotence, which would be identical with his omnipresence, which would be the same as his aseity, which would be his necessary perfection. None of these would be held to be identical with his instance of any property he contingently exemplifies. And none would be identical with an instance of any property not unique to deity. And so, on this sort of formulation of a doctrine of divine simplicity, no problem of modal uniformity or of divine uniqueness would arise.
Mann could adopt such a restricted doctrine of simplicity to avoid the problems which seem to plague his comprehensive version. But the question which would have to be asked at this point would be why such a restricted doctrine should be adopted at all. Granted, it avoids problems attending the more comprehensive formulation Mann expounds, but what would be the positive motivation for subscribing to any such simplicity doctrine at all? We have already noted that sovereignty-aseity intuitions fail to motivate any property instance view of simplicity. XVhat is just as important to note at this point is that the other motivation to which Mann appeals falls away as well in the case of the restricted sort of doctrine I have just sketched. For God's being identical only with instances of properties he intuitively is judged to have both uniquely and essentially or non-contingently will not entail his being timeless or his being absolutely immutable. Thus, the restricted version cannot serve the explanatory function with respect to these theistic claims that Mann wants of a simplicity doctrine. could 'count as' God without exemplifying them. They are in this sense necessary to deity. Further, a strong classical conception of God will involve numerous necessities de re. The great-making properties requisite for deity which are exemplified by the individual who is God will be held to be exemplified by him essentially.
Indeed
He will be such that he cannot cease to have any of the defining attributes of deity and yet continue to exist. And further, one of the properties ascribed to God in this tradition is that of necessary existence. On this conception, the individual who is God cannot cease being God. 
